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The national question has troubled Marxists of all lands. For Marxists, the national question 
has, on the one hand, been a question of democracy, a matter of the oppression of nations 
by others. On the other hand, however, Marxists have perceived the nationalist movements 
as having the potential to hinder the (inter-)national unity of the proletariat, the true agent 
of transition to socialism. This dilemma has troubled proponents of Marxism around the 
world since the time of Marx and Engels.
Marxist politics in Turkey has been no exception in this respect, and the national question 
has been a source of discomfort since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The Turkish 
Republic inherited a multi-ethnic population from the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s first 
census, conducted in 1927, revealed the following linguistic/ethnic communities within its 
borders: Turks (with a population of 11,777,810), Kurds (1,184,446), Arabs (134,273), Greeks 
(119,822), Circassians (95,901), Jews (68,900) and Armenians (64,745).1 While nearly all 
of these groups acknowledged the legitimacy of ‘the national framework’2 introduced with 
the establishment of the republic, Kurds have resisted this framework, and have done so 
by means including armed struggle, supporting the political parties in opposition, and 
escape from the reach of the state. Eventually, the Kurds’ resistance turned to become the 
only instance of the national question in Turkey bothering not only the Turkish state but 
the Turkish left too since the foundation of the Turkish Republic.
In what follows, I aim to examine this long-running preoccupation of Turkey’s Marxist 
left with the national (Kurdish) question. I will begin, however, with an exploration of the 
national question as approached by the founders of Marxism.
ABSTRACT
This essay examines Marxist Turkish left’s engagement with the 
Kurdish question in Turkey. It aims to portray, on the basis of some 
first-hand material, the theoretical inclinations and political attitudes 
of the main legal and illegal Marxist parties and organizations 
concerning the Kurdish question. It basically argues that the Turkish 
Marxists’ stressful engagement with the Kurdish question can be 
viewed in four periods corresponding to four conditions: encounter, 
union, separation, and divorce.
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158  M. Yegen 
Marxism and the national question
From Marx and Engels to Lenin, the leading figures of the first generation of European 
socialist thought and politics were discomfited by the national question. However, it looks 
fair to suggest that the preoccupation of the Marxists of the time with the national question 
was not inspired by the complexities of nationalism so much as the questions of whether or 
which nationalist movements would be supported by the workers’ movements and whether 
or which stateless nations ‘deserved’ their own states.
 Marx and Engels supported the nationalist causes of both Poland and Ireland. In the 
wake of the 1848 Revolutions, the Polish national question became about the establishment 
of an independent Polish state on territory that had been distributed in 1795 among what 
Marx called the Holy Alliance3 of Russia, Prussia and Austria. Viewing ‘the partition of 
Poland as providing the cement which held the Russian–Prussian–Austrian Holy Alliance 
together4’, both Marx and Engels supported the liberation of Poland.
 Marx and Engels also backed the liberation of Ireland. Marx, according to Michael Löwy, 
was initially ‘in favor of Ireland having autonomy within a union in Britain and believed 
that the solution to the oppression of the Irish (by the big English landlords) would come 
through a working-class (Chartist) victory in England’.5 Later, however, Marx came to sup-
port the complete liberation of Ireland from the yoke of Britain, and argued that the Irish 
needed ‘independence from England, agrarian revolution, and protective tariffs against 
England’.6 In a similar vein, Engels expressed his sympathy toward Irish nationalism and 
argued that the Irish [and the Polish] people have not only the right ‘but even the duty to 
be nationalistic before they become internationalists’.7 Marx also argued that it was ‘the 
task of the International everywhere to put the conflict between England and Ireland in 
the foreground, and everywhere to side openly with Ireland’.8
 The support of Marx and Engels for the liberation of Ireland was notably rooted in a 
different logic from that which they employed to support the liberation of Poland, however. 
While they supported the latter on the basis that it would hasten the disintegration of the 
old regimes of Europe, embedded in their support for Irish independence were hopes that 
it would reinforce the polarization between the English working class and bourgeoisie. This 
indicated that the national question was not treated by the founders of Marxism as an issue 
in and of itself, but in terms of its possible contribution to the undoing of old regimes in 
Europe and to the promotion of workers’ struggle in Europe. This is sometimes interpreted 
as a lack of theoretical systematicity and coherence with respect to the national question.9
 Engels’ analyses of nationalist resistances elsewhere may have done little to allay the 
notion that the founders of Marxism lacked coherence in their reasoning with regard to the 
national question. As is widely known, Engels had little sympathy towards several of the 
nationalist movements of the time, especially those of the ‘Southern Slavs’. While he had 
suggested that the solution to the Polish and Irish questions was liberation from the yokes of 
Russia and Britain, his proposed solution to the national questions concerning the territories 
of Austria-Hungary was the assimilation of national groups like the Czechs or Croats into 
the German or Magyar nations. His opinion was informed by the Hegelian approach to 
the category of nation, which held that the establishment of a state was a primary purpose 
of nations. Following Hegel, Engels appears to have subscribed to the notion that stateless 
nations would not contribute to the dissemination of civilization/capitalism, which was a 
prerequisite of the coming of socialism. Instead, these ‘relics’ of peoples, Engels believed, 
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would be forces that tethered Europe to the past. These ‘residual fragments’ included not 
only the Southern Slavs of Austria, but the Gaels of Scotland, the Bretons of France and 
the Basques of Spain.10
 While Marx and Engels supported the emergence of an independent Polish state in the 
context of the 1848 Revolutions, by the turn of the twentieth century their Polish follower 
Rosa Luxemburg had come out in opposition to the Polish national movement. Luxemburg’s 
rationale against the independence of Poland from Russia paralleled that of Engels’ repu-
diation of Southern Slavic nationalist movements. Having found that Poland’s integration 
with the Russian economy had accelerated the development of capitalist relations of pro-
duction there,11 Luxemburg held that the secession of Poland would mean a disruption in 
the expansion of market relations.
 Of this generation of Marxists, Otto Bauer, the leading figure of Austro-Marxism of the 
time, was one of few who recognized the cultural nature of the national question. Bauer 
acknowledged the ‘authenticity’ of the national question, and employed psycho-cultural 
terms such as ‘national characteristics’ and ‘national culture’ in his analysis of it. The national 
question (or the question of small nations) was perceived by Bauer to be more durable vis-
à-vis the dissemination of capitalist relations of production, and more resistant to being 
pacified by proletarian internationalism. Thus, the development of capitalism did not have to 
result in the extinction of small nations. Contra to Engels, for instance, he argued rather pro-
phetically that capitalist relations of production might instead end ‘not with the assimilation 
but the awakening of “non-historic” nations’.12 Likewise, he disagreed with the commonly 
held view that proletarian internationalism would necessarily neutralize the urge towards 
national membership. Instead, his observations regarding the working-class movement in 
Austria-Hungary led him to believe that workers expressed the suffering caused by their 
position in a capitalist system via a nationalist discourse. Since the dominant classes in 
Austria were of German origin, ‘the hatred against bureaucracy, nobility and the capitalist 
class’, Bauer argued, took ‘the form of the hatred of Czechs against the Germans’.13
 Having grasped the durability of ‘non-historic’ nations, Bauer advocated, in his Die 
Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (The National Question and Social Democracy) 
(1907), the solution of ‘national autonomy’ to the national question in multinational Austria-
Hungary. His solution was based on the principle that each national community should be 
able to reproduce its existence without necessity of territorial autonomy.
Lenin opposed both Bauer’s reception of and Luxemburg’s aversion to nationalist move-
ments. In Lenin’s view, Bauer’s programme of cultural-national autonomy would in practice 
mean nothing but having ‘separate schools for each nationality’.14 This, Lenin believed, would 
contradict the principle of proletarian internationalism. He argued that the workers ‘can 
be split up, divided and weakened by the advocacy of such an idea, and still more by the 
segregation, of the ordinary peoples’ schools according to nationality’.15
Lenin’s opposition to cultural-national autonomy was consistent with his distaste for 
various forms of decentralism, including federalism. Lenin saluted with no hesitation capi-
talism’s achievement of building a unified new society from the remains of old societies that 
had been split by both physical and socio-economic distance. This unity, he believed, was 
the necessary basis for a massive and unified proletariat, and that any kind of decentralism 
in modern societies would weaken the class unity of the workers. On the other hand, while 
Lenin opposed non-territorial cultural autonomy, he endorsed the idea of autonomous 
regions. He believed in ‘the necessity of replacing’ the old regional divisions in Russia with 
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160  M. Yegen 
‘others that will conform as far as possible with the national composition of the population’.16 
The creation of ‘autonomous areas … with entirely homogeneous populations’, Lenin argued, 
would help bring an end to national oppression,17 immediately adding, however, that the 
‘national-territorial’ principle could not be the only factor taken into consideration when 
drawing the boundaries of autonomous regions.
Alongside Lenin’s advocacy of culturally homogeneous autonomous zones came sup-
port of assimilation as the solution to the national question. Lenin was in fact by no means 
uncomfortable with assimilation. He firmly condemned those who did not ‘recognize and 
champion the equality of nations and languages’, but believed that the ‘true’ ideal for the 
international proletariat was to welcome ‘every kind of assimilation of nations, except that 
which is founded on force or privilege’.18
Most of all, though, Lenin is known in Marxist discussion of the national question as the 
champion of the principle of nations’ rights to self-determination. This principle was recog-
nized by Marxists as early as the London International Congress (Second International) in 
1896, wherein the congress declared that it stood for ‘the full right of all nations to self-de-
termination’.19 Despite this, not all Marxists of the time applauded the principle, neither 
was there consistent interpretation of the resolution. Luxemburg, as mentioned, was one 
of its strongest opponents.
 In contrast to Luxemburg, Lenin endorsed the right of secession by oppressed nations 
on the grounds that this right would strengthen the international proletariat movement. The 
proletariat of the oppressed nations, Lenin believed, would not support the international 
struggle of the workers against the bourgeoisie without first the workers’ movement in the 
oppressor nation recognizing the right of the oppressed nation to self-determination.20 
However, this is not to say that Lenin advocated secession as the answer to the national 
question. In his view, ‘the recognition of the right [to self-determination] does not exclude 
either propaganda and agitation against separation or the exposure of bourgeois nation-
alism’.21 While it was a right that need not be exercised, Lenin believed its recognition by 
states was necessary in order to ensure the alliance between the proletariats of oppressed 
and oppressor nations.
 The narrative above testifies to the stressful nature of early Marxist engagement with the 
national question. The Turkish left’s preoccupation with the national question has been no 
less stressful, and has been encumbered with it since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. 
In what follows, I will examine the engagement of the left with the national question in the 
Turkish context. However, as I stated at the outset, of many ethnic groups in Turkey only 
Kurds have resisted the national framework imposed by the Turkish Republic, making the 
Kurdish question the only instance of the national question in Turkey. Accordingly, the 
preoccupation of the Turkish left with the national question has actually been a preoccu-
pation with the Kurdish question. This long-running preoccupation can be examined in 
terms of four periods.
Encounter
Communist ideals were echoed in Turkey beginning only in the first decades of the twen-
tieth century, among a group of intellectuals who founded the first Turkish communist 
party after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. In the four decades following its foundation, 
Türkiye Komünist Partisi (TKP) (The Communist Party of Turkey) was the only sizeable 
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leftist organization in the country.22 It was during these four decades that the first genera-
tion of Turkish Marxists, who were actually no more than a fistful of intellectuals, initially 
encountered the Kurdish question.
The TKP’s assessments concerning the Kurdish question indicate that the leading cadres 
of the TKP shared an intellectual heritage with the founders of the young Turkish Republic. 
Like the founders of the new regime, this first generation of Turkish Marxists perceived the 
Kurdish question to be a by-product of the clash between past and present. By this way of 
thinking, which was originally championed by the founders of the republic, Kurdish unrest 
was nothing more than backlash by ‘the past’, characterized by tribalism, banditry and 
political reaction against ‘the present,’ in the form of the modern, secular, national Turkish 
republic. However, even though the TKP shared a logical framework with the founders of 
the republic (Kemalists), it differed at least in the terminology employed in its analyses of 
the Kurdish question. As students of Marxism, TKP cadres employed Marxist vocabulary 
alongside Kemalist vocabulary. At the heart of Kurdish unrest was, Turkish communists 
of the period believed, the resistance of landlords (i.e. feudalism) against the bourgeoisie 
(i.e. capitalism).
The concrete examples of this hybrid vocabulary appeared during the Kurdish rebellion 
of 1925. The sixth issue of the weekly journal of the TKP, Orak-Çekiç (Sickle-Hammer), 
published on 26 February 1925, assessed the rebellion in the following terms: ‘The rebellion 
is being headed not by Sheikh Said, but by landlordship; people side with the government 
against political reaction.’23 The seventh and last issue of the same weekly, published on 5 
March 1925, characterized the rebellion as the common enemy of the TKP and the bour-
geoisie, and urged the defeat of this ‘black power’.24 Though it echoed the new regime in 
characterizing the 1925 rebellion as political reactionary, the TKP added some ‘Marxist 
flavour’ to its own analysis. According to the TKP, beneath the question of political reac-
tionary was a more structural problem, the endurance of feudalism. To this view, the 1925 
rebellion was backed by the feudal landlords of Kurdistan who, according to the TKP, had 
to be cleansed by the republican government by means of land reform.25
The way in which the TKP viewed the Kurdish question was also shaped by Comintern’s 
strategic concerns. The TKP’s support for the Kemalists’ fight against the Kurds, in fact, was 
approved by the Comintern. Reports and articles appearing in Inprekorr, the organization’s 
‘official’ publication at the time, also portrayed the Kurdish rebellion of 1925 as a reaction 
of backward feudals, incited by British imperialists, against a progressive bourgeoisie.26 
Accordingly, the Comintern addressed a letter, in 1926, to the TKP central committee, order-
ing the TKP to denounce any show of resistance to the reforms implemented by the Ankara 
government.27 Likewise, Bukharin announced, in his speech delivered at the 12th congress 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), that the CPSU would support the new 
regime in Turkey, even when communists in Turkey were being harassed by this regime.28
The Kurdish question was once again on the agenda of communists when Kurds revolted 
again in 1930. The TKP’s analyses of the rebellion appeared in the July–August 1930 issue of 
İnkılap Yolu (Path of Revolution), the periodical of the party’s central committee. Perceiving 
again the Kurdish resistance as a reactionary movement, the TKP argued that the Kurds’ 
revolt was backed by the imperialists of the time. However, the TKP acknowledged this 
time that there was more to the Kurds’ unrest than political reactionary and imperialists’ 
provocation. This ‘more’ was put in the following terms in a key party text in 1930:
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Kurdish tribal chiefs and sheikhs are the salaried slaves of British and French imperialism…. 
However, the repulsion and partial destruction of minorities, repression of Kurdish revolt, and 
Turkification by violence … could not solve the national question. It continues to play a huge 
role. Unequal development in the country and the relative and absolute underdevelopment of 
the regions inhabited by national minorities (Kurdistan, Lazistan) are factors that constantly 
threaten the unity of the Turkish bourgeois state.’29
In other words, the TKP of the 1930s perceived the Kurdish question as a type of national 
question, intermingled with the question of the endurance of feudalism, political reactionary 
and imperialist provocation.
The idea that the Kurdish resistance may not be reduced to the endurance of feudalism 
and political reactionary was sustained by another prominent figure of the TKP, Hikmet 
Kıvılcımlı, again in the 1930s. Kıvılcımlı argued rather scandalously that the so-called 
Eastern question was in fact ‘a national question, a Kurdish national question’.30 The his-
torical facts, he suggested, testified to the notion that Kurds comprised a separate nation, 
on the basis that their community could be characterized by territorial, linguistic, cultural 
and economic unity.31 However, he added, since peasants constituted the majority of the 
Kurdish population, the Kurdish question was in essence a question of peasantry. He fur-
ther alleged that the Turkish bourgeoisie was pursuing ‘the procedures of colonization in 
Kurdistan’, and eventually reached the conclusion that the TKP’s policies concerning Kurds 
warranted a ‘serious and relentless’ critique.
However, Kıvılcımlı’s views did not resonate within the party. When Kurds revolted once 
more in Dersim (Tunceli) in 1937–38, the TKP assessed the revolt using the terminology it 
had employed in its assessments of the Kurdish rebellion of 1925.32 The Kurdish question 
was once again seen as a question stemming from the endurance of feudalism in the regions 
inhabited by Kurds.
 To conclude, the Turkish Marxists encountered the Kurdish question by virtue of the 
Kurdish revolts of the 1920s and 1930s and they basically perceived it as a question stem-
ming from the endurance of backward social relations. The idea of a national question and 
hence the Leninist principle of the right to self-determination or Bauer’s idea of ‘national 
autonomy’ were as yet on the horizon for the Turkish left.
Embracement
The Turkish left grew into a sizeable political movement for the first time during the mid-
1960s. This, of course, was related to the dramatic socio-economic change Turkey expe-
rienced after the Second World War, and the democratic climate guaranteed by the 1961 
constitution. The weekly periodical Yön (The Way) was the first to open a space for the 
Turkish left’s deliberations on the Kurdish question during this second period. Yön hosted 
critical essays concerning the Kurdish question, such as Muzaffer Erdost’s Şemdinli Röportajı 
(Şemdinli Interview) and Doğan Avcıoğlu’s Kürt Meselesi (The Kurdish Question) within 
its pages.
 The Kurdish question was touched on in Yön, if vaguely, first in the form of a discus-
sion on the underdevelopment of the Eastern region. Arguing that the governments of the 
1950s followed policies that had actually deepened regional inequalities, Yön considered 
the development of the East one of the most urgent concerns for the country.33 The ques-
tion of the endurance of landlordship became the second avenue by which the Kurdish 
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question was pursued. However, while the Kurdish question was framed as one of regional 
underdevelopment and the endurance of feudalism, and was accordingly believed to be 
solvable by way of planned development strategies, it was diffidently conceded to bear an 
ethno-cultural component.
 Articles more explicitly suggesting an ethno-cultural dimension to the question appeared 
in coming issues of Yön, in articles authored by young Kurdish intellectuals and leftists. 
Acknowledging ‘the question’ as one of underdevelopment, Sait Kırmızıtoprak, for instance, 
suggested that ‘the foundation of the idea of development’ could be taught to people in their 
mother tongues.34 Kırmızıtoprak firmly opposed assimilation and refused the idea that it 
was an indispensable ingredient of national unity.35 A bolder exposition on the dimensions 
of the question, which departed from the theme of underdevelopment, could be found in 
Şemdinli Röportajı. Published in 17 consecutive issues of Yön between July and November 
1966, Şemdinli Röportajı is particularly important in that it catalogued ethnic, historical 
and social aspects of the Kurdish question.
 Of the numerous authors who contributed to Yön, it was undoubtedly Doğan Avcıoğlu, 
the principle writer and one of the founding architects of the journal, who best represented 
it. One of his articles, entitled ‘The Kurdish question’, is distinguishable for its decisive stance 
on the issue.36 Commencing with the contention that officials treated the Kurdish question 
as though it did not exist, this short but sharp article criticized the policy of enforced inte-
gration, the failure of which, according to Avcıoğlu, was inevitable. Having conceded the 
connection between the region’s underdevelopment and the endurance of landlordship, he 
asserted the ethnic dimension: ‘Nonetheless, is it possible to solve a question with an ethnic 
dimension using economic measures alone? Numerous examples from around the world 
show us that those efforts which failed to recognize the ethnic dimension have failed.’37 As 
to the solution, Avcıoğlu was most honest, simply confessing that socialists of the time, 
himself included, were unable to prescribe a more effective solution. Avcıoğlu was honest in 
another respect as well. He did not attempt to hide his nationalist inclinations, and plainly 
warned Kurds: ‘At this point, there is no room for hesitation. We are one nation and we 
will not forfeit one inch of our land. To any oblivious persons with separatist ambitions, 
may they be mindful! They must know that socialists will fight first for an inch of land.’38
Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers Party of Turkey)
The Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP), founded by a group of trade unionists in 1961, was the first 
sizeable left-wing political party, and as such is held in high regard in the history of the 
Turkish left. Fifteen parliamentary seats were taken by socialists during this period, an 
accomplishment made more remarkable because the party had cultivated organic ties with 
Kurdish citizens and paid sincere attention to the Kurdish question. In fact, Kurds, who 
were called ‘Easterners’ in the jargon of the time, made up the third major group, alongside 
trade unionists and intellectuals, represented in the top ranks as the party blossomed.39 This 
openness to Kurds and interest in the Kurdish question eventually culminated in a revision 
of the party charter. The version approved during the first congress in 1964 proclaimed 
that the Turkish left would pay close attention to the Kurdish question, and identified the 
‘Eastern question’ as a primary concern of the party:.
Paralleling the economic backwardness of the [Eastern] region, citizens here are backward in 
social and cultural terms. Moreover, those citizens who speak Kurdish and Arabic, as well as 
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those belonging to the Alevi sect, are subject to discrimination…. These citizens … have not 
been afforded the comforts of citizenship that they have earned…. TİP will treat these groups 
as full citizens….40
Formulated by the then chair of the party, Mehmet Ali Aybar,41 this attention to the Kurdish 
question in the party programme continued to be stressed in later party documents as well. 
The second congress was held in 1966, in Malatya, a city with a considerable Alevi-Kurdish 
population. Here the party defined itself as the only political organization in which working 
people and socialist intellectuals could unite to solve the problems in the East.42 This recip-
rocal interest between the TİP and Kurds continued to grow into the following year, when 
mass demonstrations organized by the party were held in six predominantly Kurdish towns. 
Known as ‘Eastern Meetings’, these demonstrations were evidence of two developments: that 
the Turkish left had allied itself with the Kurdish citizenry, and that, after three decades, the 
Kurdish resistance had resumed, this time with a new form and discourse.
 As time passed the TİP devoted more and more space on its agenda to the Kurdish 
question, and those aspects of the question other than underdevelopment were empha-
sized once more at the third congress. In the 1968 programme, the TİP condemned the 
scorn with which Kurdish and Arabic citizens were treated, and asserted that the Eastern 
question had, in addition to an economic dimension, an identity dimension as well.43 At 
the fourth congress, held in Ankara in 1970, the TİP took its most radical stance on the 
question in announcing:
[t]hat Kurdish people inhabit the East of Turkey; that the dominant classes and fascist govern-
ments have, from the very beginning, implemented policies of oppression, terror, and assimila-
tion toward Kurds …; that the main reason for the underdevelopment of the region inhabited 
by Kurds … is, in addition to the law of unequal development of capitalism, the economic 
and social policies pursued by governments serving the dominant classes …; that, therefore, 
any consideration of the Eastern Question as a question of regional development is no more 
than an appendage of the chauvinist-nationalist perceptions and attitudes of dominant class 
governments; and that supporting the Kurdish people’s struggle for their full constitutional 
rights of citizenship … is an ordinary and obligatory task of our party….44
The Supreme Court closed down the TİP on 20 July 1971, citing the decisions of the fourth 
congress for the ban. The Turkish left paid for its embracement of Kurds.
First Schism: National Democratic Revolution (NDR)
The Turkish left had already been on its way to both an ideological and organizational split 
before the TİP was closed. By the end of the 1960s, two groups from within the party had 
begun to reveal divergent views concerning Turkey’s social structure and revolutionary 
strategy. While the leadership of the party continued to pursue a socialist revolution by 
parliamentary means, the ‘revolutionist youth’ championed the strategy of a national dem-
ocratic revolution that would be implemented by means of forceful methods.45
 Even though the Kurdish question was not among the issues leading to the first great 
schism of the Turkish left, it was obvious that the two sides of the party did not share the 
same attitude to the question. The party leadership, which was supported by the ‘Easterners’, 
gradually deepened its warm interest, meanwhile Mihri Belli, the architect of the NDR, 
seemed to catch the spirit of the TKP from the first half of the century. Like the TKP cadres, 
he sympathized with Mustafa Kemal, and viewed the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 as a 
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reactionary movement serving British imperial interests.46 Belli, however, was not entirely 
indifferent to ‘the Eastern question’, as he termed it. He supported the freedom to speak 
in one’s mother tongue, as well as the dismantling of the feudal system as the solution to 
the question. Belli argued that ‘the question would be solved within national frontiers by 
means of implementing an NDR in both the East and the West’,47 viewing it as consistent 
with the socialist principle of self-determination. He added, however, that ‘the principle 
of self-determination is not a must, and it does not follow from this principle that every 
nation, whatever the conditions, is obliged to establish its own nation-state’.48
 Belli’s ‘TKP-inspired’ views were not universally approved of by NDR supporters, who, 
from the beginning, were far from unified. This lack of unity was first manifested in the split 
among the ranks of the journal Aydınlık, which had been central for NDR followers. The 
split took place in 1969, with one group, led by Doğu Perinçek, founding the new publication 
Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık (PDA) (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment), with another 
group, led by Mihri Belli, founding Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi (ASD) (Enlightenment Socialist 
Journal). A further schism occurred within the ranks of the ASD, which was announced 
in a manifesto entitled ‘An Open Letter to Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi’,49 written by Mahir 
Çayan, Yusuf Küpeli, Ertuğrul Kürkçü and Münir Aktolga. The authors, all of whom had 
emerged as key figures in the history of the Turkish left,50 declared their discomfort with the 
nationalist inclinations of the NDR line. In the manifesto’s section on nationalism, Çayan 
and his friends denounced Belli’s contention that ‘socialists are fervent nationalists’, arguing 
that ‘socialists are patriots, not nationalists’. Belli’s view that ‘the solution to the national 
question in Turkey must be sought, in all cases, within national borders’ was also repudiated:
[t]his view is wrong and anti-socialist…. The revolutionary proletariat would consider the 
[national] question from the perspective of the principle of nations’ rights to self-determina-
tion…. The revolutionary proletariat … would discuss openly which of the solutions presup-
posed by the principle of nations’ rights to self-determination, such as separation, autonomy, 
federation, etc. would be feasible, when, and under what conditions.51
In the meantime, upholding the TKP-inspired view on the Kurdish question became more 
and more difficult in the early 1970s. This was mostly because the Turkish left now had 
deeper contact with Leninist literature. Add to this the growing mobility of Kurds. Under 
these conditions, even the PDA circle, which supported Belli’s nationalist inclinations, 
appeared loyal to the principle of nations’ rights to self-determination. When the PDA 
followers founded the illegal Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi (TİİKP) (The Revolutionary 
Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey), their party programme defined Kurds as an ancient 
people with a rich language52 and announced the Kurds’ right to self-determination and 
right to a state were acknowledged.53 However, although the TİİKP endorsed the principle 
of nations’ right to self-determination, the party still continued to associate the national 
(Kurdish) question with the NDR, saying ‘the Kurdish national question … is a part of 
our national democratic revolution because it is a national question in a semi-colonized, 
semi-feudal, third world country’.54 Accordingly, the party criticized ‘those views that iso-
late the national question from the struggle against imperialism and feudalism’.55 Likewise, 
it denounced those who perceived the Kurdish question as one of colonization, and who 
supported the establishment of separate organizations in Turkey and Turkey’s Kurdish 
provinces.
 This second period in the history of the Turkish left was important in several respects. 
First, it is evident that the Turkish left achieved the status of a genuine political movement 
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in this period. Second, an organic and sincere relationship between the left and Kurds was 
achieved for the first time during these years. Third, when reflecting on the Kurdish ques-
tion, the left dumped, though not entirely, the vocabulary of Kemalism, partly owing to the 
increased availability of Marxist-Leninist literature during this period.
 On the other hand, this second period was also host to the first grand schism in the ranks 
of the leftists as well. Though the schism was centred primarily on issues like ‘the strategy 
of revolution’ and ‘the question of alliances’, conflicting views on the Kurdish question also 
appeared around this time. Disagreement over the latter occurred principally between 
those who perceived the Kurdish question as a national question and those who continued 
to define it as a remnant of feudalism, which needed to be dealt with via radical adminis-
trative reforms. Nevertheless, the second period pivoted on the deterioration of the ‘union’ 
between the Turkish left and Kurds. By the early 1970s, Kurdish leftists had assembled their 
own political organizations.
Separation
The coup of 1971 bulldozed the Turkish left. The elite cadres of left-wing political organiza-
tions were either exterminated or imprisoned. However, the coup failed to bring an end to 
the attraction between the left and the masses in Turkey. By the mid-1970s, mass support 
for the Turkish left was larger than ever.
 The left developed a clearer vision with respect to the Kurdish question during this 
third period. It now had no doubt that the Kurdish question was a vital question for Turkey, 
and that it would be an essential aspect of the revolution. Additionally, the left was by now 
nearly united in the conviction that the Kurdish question was in principle a national ques-
tion, and hence that it must be thought of in the Leninist vocabulary of nations’ rights to 
self-determination. Although the vocabulary of the 1930s that characterized the question 
as ‘the endurance of feudalism’ was never abandoned entirely, by the mid-1970s almost all 
major arteries of the Turkish left had acknowledged the national character of the Kurdish 
question and were in agreement about the parameters and lexicon of the question.
 The fact that the Turkish left now shared a common field of engagement on the issue 
did not stop the emergence of new disagreements in respect of the question. A new dispute 
emerged among leftists as to whether the Leninist principle of nations’ right to self-deter-
mination would necessarily clear a path for Kurds toward statehood. Whether the Kurdish 
question was one of colonization, and whether Kurdish and Turkish revolutionaries should 
necessarily share the same political organizations were the other disputed issues of the 
period.
 Since many groups overlapped on essential points, a catalogue of the views of each leftist 
organization with regard to the question is of no use. Instead, I believe that an examination 
of the views of organizations representative of the three major traditions that evolved on the 
Turkish left would be adequate. This section is thus dedicated in turn to the ‘revisionists,’ 
the ‘frontists,’ and the ‘Maoists’.
‘Revisionists’
Compared with its counterpart of the 1930s, the illegal TKP of the 1970s appeared to have 
changed its views drastically on the Kurdish question. Being the leading organization of 
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the ‘revisionist’ tradition on the Turkish left, the TKP of these years acknowledged the 
national character of the question, and announced that the party was loyal to the Leninist 
principle of nations’ right to self-determination.56 However, the TKP sustained the idea 
that the principle of self-determination did not explicitly dictate the separation of nations, 
thus making room for a solution within the frontiers of the nation-states.57 Arguing that 
the right to self-determination did not have to be understood as the right to separation, the 
TKP endorsed ‘unity in opposition to separation’.58 Accordingly, the TKP suggested resolving 
the national question by means of a democratic constitution. At the 1977 party conference, 
the TKP endorsed the view that ‘all minorities, and especially Kurdish people, should be 
given their constitutional and democratic rights’ and announced that the ‘bourgeoisie’s 
policy of compulsory assimilation’ was denied.59 It was further announced that once the 
TKP had seized power, every nation would have the right to education and publication in 
its own language.60
 The TKP’s opposition to the ‘right to separation’ was naturally followed by disdain for 
the idea of separate organizations for Turkish and Kurdish leftists. Separate organizations 
would be of no use because the TKP ‘would not separate Kurdish people’s fight for freedom 
and independence from that of the Turkish people, the Turkish working class’s fight for 
democracy, national independence, and peace’.61 However, though the party was opposed to 
the separation of the two struggles into the Kurdish question and the question of socialism 
in Turkey, it was still apparent that the former was, in the eyes of the TKP cadres, subject 
to the latter. For the TKP, ‘the question of the unity of workers, peasants, and labourers of 
all nations was the most important of all … and all other questions were dependent on this 
main one’.62 In other words, the solution to the Kurdish question was believed to be part 
and parcel to the establishment of socialism in Turkey.
‘Frontists’
Two illegal organizations, Kurtuluş (Liberation) and Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Way), 
were the primary successors to the ‘front’ tradition in Turkey that had been established by 
the THKP-C during the early 1970s. These two popular organizations managed to carve out 
a militant leftist space within the wide gap that separated the revisionists and Maoists, the 
pro-Soviet and pro-China inclinations. Sharing organizational roots and pursuing leftist pol-
itics in this same ‘middle’ space, these two groups were alike in several respects. Nonetheless 
Kurtuluş and Devrimci Yol diverged on the issue of the role they assigned to the industrial 
proletariat63 and, more importantly, on their perspectives regarding the Kurdish question.
 Kurtuluş emphasized the national characteristic of the Kurdish question in a most 
determined manner, which produced an unbridgeable gap between it and the rest of the 
Turkish left. Among the group’s theses, the most significant was one concerning the status of 
Kurdistan. Kurtuluş defined the relationship between Turkey and Kurdistan as a relationship 
between colonizer and colonized.64 Another radical thesis of Kurtuluş had to do with the 
group’s interpretation of the principle of nations’ right to self-determination. According 
to Kurtuluş, Kurds’ right to separation had to be recognized not only theoretically but 
practically too. A Kurdish national movement towards separation must be recognized as 
legitimate, Kurtuluş argued, and should Kurds opt for this solution it must not be opposed.65 
By extension, Kurtuluş took a stance in favour of separate political organizations for Turks 
and Kurds.66
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 The radical views espoused by Kurtuluş prompted severe debate and sharp criticism. 
Among these critiques was one posed by Devrimci Yol, which, like Kurtuluş, endorsed a 
‘people’s democratic revolution’. To begin with, Devrimci Yol did not share the aforemen-
tioned view of Kurdistan as a colony of Turkey. This fundamental disagreement was fol-
lowed by two others, these concerning the timing of revolutions in Turkey and Kurdistan, 
and the issue of separate organizations for Turks and Kurds. Although it conceded that 
the Kurdish question was a national one, and although it promised to support the Kurds’ 
struggle, Devrimci Yol sharply opposed the thesis that Kurdistan was a colony. Devrimci 
Yol suggested that the relationship between Kurds and Turks was a relationship between 
‘oppressor and oppressed nations in an old-type multinational state.’67 Accordingly, the 
group opposed the separation of Kurdish and Turkish leftist organizations and opposed 
the idea that a separate Kurdistan revolution was inevitable.68
‘Maoists’
Maoism was insufficient as a general guide to prevent Maoist groups within Turkey from 
diverging. Roughly speaking, Turkey has had three major Maoist veins with irreconcila-
ble theses. Türkiye Komünist Partisi – Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML) (Communist Party of 
Turkey – Marxist-Leninist), Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi (TİKP) (Workers and Peasants Party 
of Turkey), and Türkiye Devrimci Komünist Partisi (TDKP) (Revolutionary Communist 
Party of Turkey) have all been active since the mid-1970s. These three organizations have 
had major disputes over both internal and external affairs, such as the Three World Theory, 
the nature of Kemalism and the Kurdish question. TKP-ML espoused the most radical views 
on the Kurdish question while the Maoist TİKP championed ‘national unity.’ The TDKP 
was positioned in-between the other two groups on this issue.
 The TKP-ML has been remarkably consistent in its position on Turkey’s social structure. 
Since its founding in the mid-1970s, this illegal organization has advanced the view that 
Turkey is a semi-colonized and semi-feudal country. This social structure, it adds, calls for 
a people’s democratic revolution comprising anti-imperialist and anti-feudal efforts.69 The 
TKP-ML has been consistent in its views on the Kurdish question too, recognizing it as a 
national question, and acknowledging the Kurds’ right to separation. According to the party, 
Kurdish secession is not required, but should Kurds move to establish their own state, the 
decision would be welcomed.70
 Founded in the late 1970s by the Aydınlık circle of the early 1970s, TİKP was the most 
resolute advocate of nationalist democratic revolution, albeit in a diluted form that reduced 
the idea of NDR to a mere anti-imperialist strategy. While Turkey was gradually being 
pulled into civil war during the late 1970s, the TİKP maintained that the primary con-
tradiction was not between the social classes within Turkey, but between Turkey and the 
‘social imperialist’ USSR.
 Although the TİKP progressively revealed nationalist inclinations, it never abandoned 
Leninist terminology, and continued to endorse nations’ right to self-determination.71 As 
for the solution to the Kurdish question, the TİKP ambiguously advocated ‘removing all 
privileges’. This ambiguity was particularly noteworthy compared with the language used by 
other left-wing organizations of the time. An even more radical difference, though, emerged 
in respect of the TİKP’s appraisal of Kurdish resistance during the 1970s, blaming ‘foreign 
incitement’ for the unrest of Kurds in Turkey. Moreover, the TİKP blamed Kurdish left-wing 
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organizations for being ‘nationalist’ and for collaboration with the USSR. The party believed 
the USSR intended to build a ‘puppet [Kurdish] state’ in the Middle East using Turkey’s 
Kurdish leftists to achieve this.72
 Within Maoist circles, Halkın Kurtuluşu (People’s Liberation) had the greatest mass sup-
port. With regard to the Kurdish question, the group, like many other leftist organizations 
of the time, had no qualms about invoking the principle of nations’ rights to self-determina-
tion.73 Accusing the TKP of the past of opportunism and social-chauvinism, it alleged that 
this position was still pursued by some leftists of the 1970s, but that this position reinforced 
the narrow-mindedness and nationalism of an oppressed nation. Thus, many Kurdish rev-
olutionaries had adopted bourgeois nationalism as a response to the social-chauvinism of 
revisionists and opportunist.74 Halkın Kurtuluşu accused such Kurdish revolutionaries of 
non-Marxist behaviour and of treating the Kurdish question in isolation.
 The claim made by Kurtuluş that Kurdistan was a colony of Turkey was categorically 
denounced by Halkın Kurtuluşu. The exploitation of Kurdistan, it was posed instead, was 
not separate from the exploitation of Turkey in general.75 Accordingly, those who defined 
Kurdistan as a colony of Turkey and those who championed separate political organizations 
for Turkish and Kurdish leftists were perceived not to be anti-capitalist at all. Thus, it was 
announced that those national liberation struggles that were bereft of an anti-capitalist per-
spective would not be supported.76 For Halkın Kurtuluşu, the Kurdish political movement 
separated from proletarian struggle would inevitably fall under the mandate of imperial-
ism. To avoid this, it was necessary to try to solve the Kurdish national question under the 
leadership of a revolutionary party of the Turkish and Kurdish proletariat.77
 To summarize, it was during this third period of the Turkish left that its bond with 
Kurds and position on the Kurdish question began to splinter in earnest. On one side, the 
main body of the left divorced itself from Kemalism during the seventies and acknowledged 
the national nature of the Kurdish question. Likewise, guided by Leninist orthodoxy, the 
majority of leftist circles now recognized the Kurdish nation’s right to self-determination. 
On the other hand, with the exception of Kurtuluş, most leftist circles objected to Kurdish 
leftists’ claims that Kurdistan was a colony of Turkey, and that the Kurds’ struggle for liber-
ation might be independent of the struggle for socialism in Turkey. This schism paved the 
way for a deep separation between Turkish and Kurdish leftists. By the end of the 1970s, 
the majority of Kurdish leftists affiliated exclusively with Kurdish sects or parties.
Divorce
The coup that seized Turkey on 12 September 1980 was extraordinarily oppressive. More 
than 500,000 citizens were taken into custody, approximately 100,000 citizens were sued on 
the accusation of membership in illegal organizations, more than 30,000 fled the country, 
and 50 young men were executed in the few years following the coup. The result was that 
the Turkish left was heavily suppressed in the 1980s. The Kurdish left experienced nearly 
the same fate, with the exception of the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) (Worker’s Party 
of Kurdistan), which saved some of its members from the coup, then began to wage a guer-
rilla struggle in 1984. By the late 1980s, Kurdish unrest in Turkey took the form of a mass 
movement led by the PKK or its legal appendages. Hence, when the Turkish left attempted 
to resume its political activities during the late 1980s, they experienced a new asymmetry 
with the Kurdish left, felt in both size and influence. Furthermore, the lexicon of the Kurdish 
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left by now had absorbed many ‘bourgeois’ and ‘nationalist’ terms such as ‘human rights’ 
and ‘independent Kurdistan’. Most importantly of all, while the PKK insisted on an armed 
struggle, most of the remnants of the Turkish left were now inclined to carry out a legal 
political struggle as opposed to a guerrilla resistance. This ever-growing asymmetry even-
tually resulted in the divorce of the Turkish left from the Kurds and the Kurdish question. 
However, the divorce in question assumed different forms in the case of different traditions 
of the Turkish left. The successor of each of the three traditions of the 1970s divorced itself 
from the Kurds and the Kurdish question in its own particular way.
 Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP) was founded in 1996 by successors Devrimci Yol 
and Kurtuluş, the two illegal organizations of the frontist tradition of the 1970s. The Kurdish 
question was the most hotly debated issue within the ÖDP during its first few years. The 
debate did not burn over the ‘nature’ of the question, though. There was consensus among 
the party ranks that it was a national question, and that Kurds were legitimately represented 
by Kurdish organizations (both legal and illegal), namely the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP) 
(People’s Labour Party) and the PKK. Because of this, the ÖDP shied away from proposing 
programmes towards resolution of the Kurdish question. The separation of organizations 
between Kurdish and Turkish membership had the parallel impact of separating issues, 
such that it became as though the ÖDP were no longer also a party for Kurdish citizens, or 
that the Kurdish question was no longer a Turkish question. The ÖDP did not keep branch 
offices in Kurdish provinces for a long time, and Kurdish people did not show significant 
support for the party. The tacit agreement was now that the Kurdish question was a question 
for Kurds, via Kurdish representation. Within the ÖDP, the dispute thus became about the 
place of the Kurdish question on the party’s agenda, and about the possibility of building 
relationships with the Kurdish representation in Turkish politics. While the successors of 
Kurtuluş in the ÖDP maintained that the Kurdish question needed to remain at the top of 
the agenda, and that the ÖDP must offer unconditional support to their representatives in 
both the legal and illegal organizations, the successors of Devrimci Yol opposed the priv-
ileged positioning of the question on the party’s agenda. Likewise, they opposed strong 
support of Kurds on the grounds that it would weaken the party. This dispute prompted the 
successors of Kurtuluş to split from the ÖDP in 2001. Following this there remained almost 
no connection between the Devrimci Yol tradition and the Kurds and the Kurdish question.
Some successors of the illegal TKP of the 1970s resurfaced in a legal version of the TKP 
in 2001. Albeit that this specified Turks and Kurds as the equal elements of the working class 
in Turkey, the TKP still remained loyal to Marxist orthodoxy and accordingly defined the 
Kurdish question in Turkey as a labour question in practice.78 The TKP remained loyal not 
only to the Marxist orthodoxy, but to Kemalist orthodoxy as well. Like the communists of 
the 1930s, dthe TKP of the new millennium perceived the Kurdish question as a social and 
historical anomaly. At its 2004 conference, the party announced that it would endeavour to 
eliminate tribal structures and the traces of same that lingered in cultural and ideological 
domains. The TKP also declared that the Kurdish labourers needed to be ‘transformed’. 
The Kurdish labourers, the TKP suggested, had to be imbued with an anti-imperialist and 
class-based consciousness, in contrast to a national one.79 Unsurprisingly, today, the TKP 
has no support from Kurds in Turkey.
 While the successors of the revisionist and frontist traditions of the 1970s tended to 
distance themselves from Kurds and the Kurdish question beginning in the 1990s, the 
successor of the Maoist TİKP, İşçi Partisi (İP)80 gradually developed a nationalist-socialist 
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standpoint. According to the İP, today’s Kurdish question is not a genuine political ques-
tion, but a fake question created by the US and the EU imperialisms. In the words of Doğu 
Perinçek, the İP chair who happened to have led both the Aydınlık circle and the TİKP 
during the 1970s, ‘[t]he Kurdish question has been resolved with respect to democratic 
rights and freedoms’ and ‘our citizens of Kurdish origin have obtained their democratic 
rights in every sphere’.81 Perinçek’s view has been endorsed by the central body of the party 
as well.82 By extension of the logic that the Kurdish question was resolved, the İP has long 
been championing a policy of assimilation.83 Also, İP is now a firm opponent of the current 
negotiations between the Turkish state and the PKK, and sustains a politics of oppression 
in the field of the Kurdish question.
 To conclude, having separated from the Kurds and the Kurdish question in the mid-
1970s, the Marxist Turkish left finally divorced itself from the Kurdish question in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s. In other words, by the 2000s there remained almost no sizeable 
link between the Turkish left and the Kurds and the Kurdish question. However, the divorce 
in question took place on different grounds and in different ways. ÖDP, the successor of 
the frontist tradition, divorced itself from the Kurds and the Kurdish question on political 
grounds, i.e. on the ground that the Kurdish question should no longer be at the top of 
the political agenda of the Turkish left and on the ground that Kurds had now their true, 
nationalist representatives. The TKP, the successor of the revisionist tradition, on the other 
hand, divorced itself from the Kurdish question mainly on an ideological basis. Perceiving 
the struggle of Kurds and Kurdish parties as inferior to the leftists’ struggle for socialism, 
the TKP chose to remain loyal to the orthodox conviction that all struggles other than the 
one for socialism have to be subjected to the latter. The successor of the Maoist tradition İP, 
on the other hand, divorced itself from Kurds and their struggle on the grounds of enmity 
and completed its transformation into a nationalist-socialist party.
Conclusion: re-embracement? 
The foregoing narrative attests to the fact that the Turkish left’s relation with the Kurdish 
question during the republican period in Turkey can be viewed in four periods roughly 
corresponding to four conditions: encounter, embracement, separation, and divorce. The 
Turkish left first encountered the Kurdish question during the mid-1920s, and the period 
was notable for the left’s lack of distinct language, due to its strong bonds with the Comintern 
and Kemalism. During these years, the left viewed the Kurdish question as a remnant of the 
past to be undone by the era’s reformist efforts. The Marxist left grew into a sizeable actor 
in Turkish politics during the 1960s, when the Kurdish question first entered the agenda of 
legal Turkish politics in the republican era. It was during this second period that the Turkish 
left voiced the Kurdish question and embraced the Kurds. However, it was during the 1970s, 
i.e. in the third period, that the Turkish left began to endorse the most radical solutions 
to the Kurdish question. Inspired by Leninism now, the Turkish left defined the Kurdish 
question as a national question and discussed it in terms of the Leninist dictum, nations’ 
right to self-determination. However, it was during the same period that the Turkish left 
and the Kurdish opposition separated. Albeit that the Kurdish movement separated from 
the Turkish left it remained leftist and this is why the leftist imagery is so powerful in today’s 
Kurdish movement. Nonetheless, the Kurdish movement’s loyalty to the spirit of leftism did 
not stop the eventual divorce of the Turkish left from the Kurdish question and the Kurds. 
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Given that the Marxist Turkish left was shrunk into an ignorable size as opposed to the fact 
that the Kurdish movement turned into a massive political and armed movement in the 
context of the new millennium, it became impossible for the former to supervise the latter 
as it is assumed in Marxist orthodoxy and hence the Turkish left divorced itself from the 
Kurds and the Kurdish question.
 The Turkish left and the Kurds stood apart throughout the first decade of the first 
millennium. In fact, it was as if the state of divorce was going to be the ultimate form of 
the relationship between the Turkish left and the Kurdish movement. However, relations 
between the Turkish left and the Kurdish movement have changed once more in the last 
few years, making a brand new state of relationship between the two possible.
 Having abandoned the ideal of building an independent Kurdistan on ‘Turkish’ territory 
as early as 1993, the PKK substantially changed its strategic goal recently. The PKK has for 
some time been sustaining a new programme established on denigration of the nation-state 
and ‘capitalist modernity’. Tagging these as the two evils responsible for the sufferings of 
the last century in Turkey and in the Middle East, the PKK proposed a new programme 
informed by the principles of a ‘democratic nation’ and ‘democratic modernity’. While the 
idea of a democratic nation entails a polity run by a multicultural logic, the idea of ‘demo-
cratic modernity’ as opposed to ‘capitalist modernity’ refers to a desire to transcend capital-
ism in a way other than was tried in the case of real socialism. The PKK merged these two 
principles into one single motto, namely ‘democratic autonomy’, and this has become the 
new strategic goal to achieve for the PKK.84 Having substantially renewed its strategic goal, 
the PKK changed its main means as well. While the PKK has for long prioritized unarmed 
struggle, it announced recently in 2013 that the era of armed struggle was over and it was 
now time for political struggle.85
 This substantial renewal in the aim and the means of the PKK was accompanied by 
the PKK-backed legal circles’ attempt to build a rainbow coalition composed of a Kurdish 
movement, socialists, feminists, and religious and ethnic minorities. The last attempt to build 
such a coalition seems to have been a success. Established by numerous parties, groups, 
organizations and initiatives, in 2012 Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic 
Party – HDP) received 13.1% of votes and won 80 seats in parliament in the elections in 
June 2015, which, considering that the former political parties of the Kurdish movement 
in Turkey received between 4% and 6% of votes in the previous elections, can be registered 
as an important success.
 Both the establishment of the HDP and its success in the elections indicate that divorce 
is not the main form of the relationship between the Turkish left and the Kurdish move-
ment any more. It seems that some segments of the Turkish left and the Kurdish movement 
have now re-embraced. However, it is important to note that this re-embracement did not 
take place between the same actors who divorced in the 1990s. Instead, it is evident that 
both the Turkish left and the Kurdish movement have changed greatly since the time of 
the divorce. While both the Turkish left and the Kurdish movement were typical Marxist-
Leninist movements of the world of the 1970s, the Kurdish movement took a radical step 
towards a radical democratic imaginary. The step taken by the Kurdish movement was 
followed by some segments of the Turkish left and this made a re-embracement possible. 
Today, many segments of the Turkish left and the Kurdish movement are standing together 
again, albeit with a renewed political imaginary.
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